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Abstract 
In this essay, Steven Burik discusses Jacques Derrida’s position with regard to the place of education in 
philosophy within the university system, and then relates these thoughts to comparative philosophy. 
Philosophers find themselves constantly having to defend philosophy and the importance of teaching 
philosophy against pressure from the powers that be. Burik contends that the argument Derrida set forth 
to "protect" philosophy entails a double bind: Derrida emphasized the value and importance of 
philosophical thinking while at the same time criticizing the limits of philosophy, both self-mandated and 
externally imposed. Derrida’s defense of philosophy was anything but a protection of the status quo, 
according to Burik. Derrida ultimately argued that the teaching of philosophy and philosophy itself should 
be inherently open to new developments. Burik relates Derrida’s defense of philosophy and attack on 
mainstream philosophy to comparative philosophy, demonstrating that both argue for an expansion of 
thinking beyond the narrow Western confines of philosophy as "pure" reason or rationality by showing 
how alterity always inserts itself, and that both seek to give this alterity a valid place in educational 
systems. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In light of the recent translations of Jacques Derrida’s main work on education and philosophy, Du droit à 
la philosophie, I propose to discuss his thoughts with regard to the place of education in philosophy, in 
particular within today’s university system, and relate these thoughts to comparative philosophy.1 
                                                          
1 Jacques Derrida, Du droit ă la philosophie (Paris: Editions Galilĕe, 1990), translated in two parts as Who’s Afraid 
of Philosophy? Right to Philosophy I (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2002) and Eyes of the 
University: Right to Philosophy II (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2004), trans. Jan Plug and 
others. These works will be cited in the text as RP I and RP II, respectively, for all subsequent references. 
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Derrida has argued that philosophy should definitely be taught in secondary schools and universities, yet 
nowadays philosophers find themselves constantly having to defend philosophy and the teaching of it 
against ever‐increasing pressures from the powers that be. The value of philosophy is no longer obvious 
in modern societies, which are increasingly based on the structures of capitalism and a market economy. 
This modern influence of commerce is increasingly evident in universities, where there has been a 
decrease in support for and popularity of disciplines or research having no immediate economic value. 
Against these threats philosophy has had and will have to defend itself time and again. I will show that in 
Derrida’s case this defense is anything but a protection of the status quo. Derrida’s “protection” of 
philosophy entails a double bind. I will first explain Derrida’s double position with regard to the teaching 
of philosophy through examining his views concerning the place of the university as a site of reason and 
thinking, concepts that he questioned and broadened. While Derrida defended the university as an 
institution, he attacked its current position. In analyzing his views on this issue, I will show how this part 
of his thinking is coherent with his wider work. Finally, I will introduce comparative philosophy into the 
discussion, since I think that it is here that we can find ways of thinking that actively broaden our 
understanding of philosophy and what an education in philosophy entails. 
This “transformation” of our understanding of philosophy does not mean that philosophy as traditionally 
understood is totally wrong or to be discarded. Although philosophy in principle knows of no limit to its 
objects of study, Derrida was not a relativist or nihilist, and he implied that not every kind of worldview 
or way of life automatically has the status of philosophy. While constantly questioning philosophy, 
deconstruction also affirms it and defends philosophy against “anything that might come along to threaten 
this integrity, dissolve, dissect, or disperse the identity of the philosophical as such” (RP II, 170). I offer 
this comment to counter the common conception that Derrida’s thinking is just a simple destruction of the 
metaphysical, logocentric tradition without anything to offer in its place. Instead I will show that his 
attacks function in multiple ways and result in what I characterize as Derrida’s double bind: while he 
defended philosophical thinking, he simultaneously attacked mainstream philosophy. 
I will thus focus on the openness that philosophy itself and an education in philosophy should exhibit, 
explaining that this openness must give rise to a greater space for comparative philosophy. But arguing 
along Derridean lines, this greater space entails a double bind as well. I will then use this idea of openness 
in philosophy to argue for the need to incorporate different approaches to philosophy into the educational 
system. 
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DERRIDA ON EDUCATION IN PHILOSOPHY 
Derrida’s works on education and philosophy defend philosophy and its importance while at the same 
time criticizing both the limits philosophy has imposed on itself as well as the limits imposed by external 
forces. While many of these works focus specifically on the threats to philosophy and its teaching in 
France at the time Derrida was writing, they have implications that reach far beyond that particular time 
and place. 
Derrida understood the modern university as a thoroughly Western institution largely based on the 
nineteenth‐century model of the German university, which was itself a restructured version of pre‐
Enlightenment universities. The modern university has developed into different departments, faculties, 
and the like, all dealing in their own fashion with their own subjects. As its foundation or raison d’être, 
the modern university has the principle of reason or rationality. This overarching unifier is, ideally, 
embodied in (the faculty of) philosophy, and so philosophy has a priority status (that is, in the ideal 
situation, for this position of philosophy is now under attack by other disciplines). Yet, as Derrida 
explained, the principle of reason itself remains unquestioned, raising the issue of what grounds this 
foundational principle. He argued that “an event of foundation can never be comprehended merely within 
the logic that it founds.… The origin of the principle of reason, which is also implicated in the origin of 
the university, is not rational” (RP II, 109). This conclusion leads to an awareness that the university 
should acknowledge its position as an institution of knowledge, truth, and reason. This also means 
that as an institution the university influences work carried out in its name, and that entails a certain 
responsibility that I will discuss further later in this essay. This conclusion at the same time means that the 
particular forms of Knowledge and Reason that have exemplified and identified Western philosophy, and 
thus Western universities in general, should not be closed off preemptively from other ways of knowing. 
The university cannot shut itself off from this responsibility and needs to open up its own rigid structures. 
The university is a place where responsibility means responsiveness to different situations and to different 
times. Achieving this requires not only more interdisciplinary activities, but also an intradisciplinary 
transformation of the teachings of philosophy (and other disciplines) in response to new objects of study 
and new or different ideas that come from outside the original university circle. 
Responsibility is not primarily toward the state or toward the powers that be. A university needs open 
discussion and opportunities for research that are not merely “end‐oriented,” but more or less 
“fundamental” or “basic.” Although Derrida complicated the distinction between basic or fundamental 
(that is, objective or disinterested or “useless”) research on the one hand, and end‐oriented (or “useful”) 
research on the other,2 he nevertheless argued for the need to restore opportunities to pursue research and 
                                                          
2 See, for example, RP II, 142 ff, where Derrida maintained that ‘‘this opposition between the basic and the end-
oriented is of real but limited relevance. It is difficult to maintain this opposition with thoroughgoing conceptual as 
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knowledge now prohibited or marginalized by forces both inside and outside the university. Undertaking 
this is not unproblematic; it should entail at the very least an awareness that all research and knowledge 
have implications beyond their own confines and actively take responsibility for this awareness. All 
research and knowledge are “committed,” but we can be responsibly aware of the implications of this 
possible commitment (RP II, 146–150). The decision to accept this responsibility is one that philosophy 
and the university should make in order to ensure their viability. But this decision, according to Derrida, 
cannot be comprehended solely by the logic of reason as the fundamental ground of the university. 
Derrida argued for a reinterpretation of the purpose of both the university and of philosophy in it. 
Philosophy is no longer the autonomous discipline it long pretended to be. Derrida argued that philosophy 
cannot be separated from its institutions, which are the university, schools, disciplines, media and 
publishing industries, and, most importantly, language.3 According to Derrida, since there is no neutral or 
universal language, any natural language in which philosophy is taught should also be seen as an 
institution of philosophy. This shows that philosophy is not the universal discipline of pure reason it has 
always presented itself as, but that institutions of philosophy (including, and foremost among these, 
language) are a major influence on the content or meaning of philosophies, and not just a means to their 
distribution. 
Derrida questioned the structure of the university just as he had the structure of language. Language is 
indispensable, but it is not neutral and is easily corrupted. Language readily (and maybe even necessarily) 
becomes an instrument of a certain way of thinking instead of a tool for thinking in general. Language 
does not fulfill its promise of pure medium. In the same way, Derrida argued that the university does not 
provide “unmediated” teaching. Many factors increase the chance of the university not being able or 
willing to provide instruction covering the widest possible range of philosophical thinking, because more 
often than not philosophy in the university limits itself to what mainstream Western philosophers have 
considered it should be. 
Read in this way, Derrida seemed to have been doing some sort of metaphilosophy, yet the important 
feature of this metaphilosophy is exactly that it is no longer strictly philosophical, or purely rational 
(which does not mean that it is irrational), in that no higher principle of reason or ground is evoked or 
insinuated, but an indeterminacy. From this indeterminacy spring the decision to open up and the 
                                                          
well as practical rigor.’’ Further on, Derrida noted: “One can no longer distinguish between the technological on the 
one hand and the theoretical, the scientific, and the rational on the other.” 
3 Although Derrida acknowledged the fact that philosophy is not to be limited to its institutions, and always has to 
have the freedom to question these institutions (see RP II, 170 – 171), it is nevertheless practically, historically 
(especially since Kant), and to a large extent philosophically bound by institutions that regulate its dissemination, 
such as the university, media, the publishing industry, and so on. And as language, or writing, philosophy is 
institutional as such since the necessary recourse to language disappoints all efforts to do philosophy without 
mediation (see RP I, 28). 
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responsibility for this opening up, which are thus at the same time inside and outside of philosophy. The 
rationality of Western philosophy is not so much to be replaced by some higher order or principle; rather, 
it is to be seen as one form of thinking among others. 
This is where I think comparative philosophy has an important role to play, since it seeks to establish that 
the inevitable influences from different cultures should not be seen as a hindrance to philosophy; indeed, 
such influences should be incorporated in order to realize philosophy’s utmost potential, which is 
manifested in the richness of diversity that is responsible for different philosophies. This diversity should 
be guarded and developed. What Derrida saw as the main lack in (the teaching of) philosophy is thus its 
one‐sided approach and the refusal to acknowledge this one‐sidedness. 
In the same way, the assaults from various other disciplines within the university and from forces outside 
of the university on diversity in teaching and research in academia—especially (but not only) in the area 
of philosophy—are also, and not unimportantly so, challenges to comparative philosophy. The possibility 
for dissent and for diversity of interpretations and topics needs to be guarded and expanded within the 
university system if comparative philosophy is to make any headway. 
To reiterate, the main force of Derrida’s work is the call to open up philosophy and education in 
philosophy to what is usually considered to be outside of it: “We stand opposed to whatever would 
prohibit philosophy from… opening itself up to new objects in a way that knows no limit of principle, 
from recalling that it was already present there where no one wanted to acknowledge it” (RP II, 170). This 
force of prohibition could take many forms and is not just limited to state power or other legal 
prohibitions, but ranges from educational aspects (such as lack of support for research), to media and 
publishing industries, to philosophers themselves who oppose any widening of, or incursion into, the 
strictly philosophical by something they see as being “outside.” 
Seen in this institutional light, the crisis of philosophy is necessarily the crisis of the teaching of 
philosophy, where we can no longer define clearly and perpetuate the idea of philosophy as a purely 
Western discipline. This situation leads to a double bind, as noted previously: On the one hand, we must 
protect philosophy against the ongoing onslaught of other disciplines as well as forces outside of the 
university, for example, by the “State and by a certain liberal logic of the marketplace.”4 On the other 
hand, this protection of philosophy is actually an attack on a certain idea of philosophy and on 
philosophical protectionism. The defenders of the status quo in philosophy and its teaching are criticized 
for not allowing anything new to “invade” philosophy—that is, for structurally denying and marginalizing 
anything that does not fit their picture of philosophy or of how, where, and when it should be taught, and 
                                                          
4 Jacques Derrida, Points...: Interviews, 1974–1994, ed. Elisabeth Weber, trans. Peggy Kamuf and others (Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 1995), 411 – 412. 
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thereby denying new or different ways of thinking a proper place within philosophy, as well as denying 
other disciplines the right to criticize philosophy. 
Derrida’s criticism entails a different understanding of education in philosophy and of the university 
system as a whole. It raises the question of the university as a defender of a certain type of Western logic, 
rationality, and reason, as foundation. Against this idea, but not against foundations as such, the 
university should be a place that is less universalistic, and more open to “planetary thinking,” to use 
Martin Heidegger’s expression.5 Derrida played with the Heideggerian notion of “thinking” and the idea 
of a “community of thought” replacing that of “traditional” philosophy.6 This “community of thought” 
entails expanding the notion of thinking beyond the narrow Western confines of philosophy as “pure” 
reason, but also beyond the confines of technological and economic end‐oriented reason. Yet this thinking 
is not irrational because it challenges Western forms of rationality. As the specific Western form of 
rationality, “reason is only one species of thinking” (RP II, 148). 
Taking this “thinking” as his background, Derrida called for the university to rebuild itself as a place of 
“reflection” (RP II, 154), which entails a widening in the sense that the university should also reflect on 
itself and its own presuppositions as an institution. If it is to preserve its viability, then the university 
should decide to allow research that does not fit its categories, under the assumption that on reflection it 
will find its own confines too narrow, especially in the field of philosophy. As Derrida said, “Philosophy 
has no horizon, if the horizon is, as its name indicates, a limit, if ‘horizon’ means a line that encircles or 
delimits a perspective” (RP I, 16, emphasis in original). 
 
SITUATING EDUCATION IN PHILOSOPHY IN THE CONTEXT OF DECONSTRUCTION 
Derrida’s ideas about teaching philosophy and about how institutions influence both the teaching of 
philosophy and philosophy itself are coherent with his wider work, which is a challenge to Western 
philosophy itself. Deconstruction is a challenge to and a critique of certain structures and the way that 
they impose themselves on our thinking, but at the same time deconstruction is an affirmation of the 
necessity of thinking and of exposing these structures. If we take Derrida’s ideas about the “subject” as an 
example, we see that it is a matter of de‐constructing, not just of undermining or demolishing: 
To deconstruct the subject does not mean to deny its existence. There are subjects, “operations” 
or “effects” (effets) of subjectivity. This is an incontrovertible fact. To acknowledge this does not 
                                                          
5 Martin Heidegger, Wegmarken (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1967), 424, my translation. I take the “universalistic” 
approach in this context to mean the extrapolation of Western values and systems of education to other parts of the 
world. 
6 Although Derrida’s use of the term is not exactly like Heidegger’s, the comparison is still useful. 
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mean, however, that the subject is what it says it is. The subject is not some meta‐linguistic 
substance or identity, some pure cogito of self‐presence; it is always inscribed in language. My 
work does not, therefore, destroy the subject; it simply tries to resituate it.7 
Derrida’s work is thus not simply negative; it is an affirmation as well. It does not simply destroy 
something to do away with it or to be replaced by something else. Derrida always tried to show things are 
not as easy as they are presented to be, or they are not as straightforward as our common sense assumes. 
Yet this does not amount to a simple denial of certain concepts, principles, and the like; it is more a 
question of complicating what is taken for granted, pointing to what has been overlooked in establishing 
identities. 
In this way Derrida always saw himself as both inside and outside of philosophy. He remained inside 
because he often asked the same questions as other philosophers, and because he wanted to expand the 
notion of philosophy to encompass more ways of thinking. He was outside because he, like Heidegger, 
identified philosophy with Western metaphysics and ontotheology, and similarly tried to overcome this in 
a certain way. He also was positioned outside of philosophy as the relentless questioning and thinking 
taking place under the generic name of deconstruction assumes many forms that are not easily identifiable 
within the stricter versions of philosophy. Thus he was often ostracized from the community of “real,” or 
academic, philosophers. 
Deconstructions create an awareness of the fact that any ideal objectivity, or transcendental signified, is 
embedded and thus indebted to the signifier that points to it and to the signifying structure in general. This 
includes all structures of institutionalization, up to the point where signifier and signified can no longer be 
separated, which eventually means that the transcendental signified is denied. Translated to education, 
this means that philosophy and education cannot be separated, “deconstruction… has therefore in 
principle always concerned the apparatus and function of teaching in general, the apparatus and function 
of philosophy in particular and par excellence” (RP I, 73). So what Derrida did is in principle and of 
necessity work on what philosophy has always considered secondary and of no real importance to its 
content and meaning, that is, signifying structures in general and those influencing philosophical work in 
particular. Thus coming back to the topic of education, we can say that language, teaching, and 
institutions of knowledge (and therefore of power) such as the university, are exactly such signifying 
structures and Derrida’s intention is in every case to show how they influence and to a great extent even 
constitute philosophy. 
                                                          
7 Derrida quoted in Richard Kearney, Dialogues with Contemporary Continental Thinkers (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1984), 125 (emphasis in original). 
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Since the insertion of alterity into the field of philosophy proper is what Derrida espoused, the notion of 
“otherness,” or alterity, in his work is complex but fundamental.8 He maintained that deconstruction “is 
always deeply concerned with the ‘other’ of language” and that “the critique of logocentrism is above all 
else the search for the ‘other’ and the ‘other of language’.”9 The problem with the concept of the “other” 
seems to be how it can possibly have any effect on the self since if it is the other of language, then it is 
also the other of all our reference or signifying structures, and is thus inaccessible. As Derrida said, 
“every other is completely other.”10 What is “other” always escapes our efforts at appropriation, yet it 
seems constitutive of our being while remaining ever singular and evasive. It is thus exemplary of the 
double bind we find in so much of Derrida’s work, the combination of possibility and impossibility. 
To come back to the supposedly total and radical alterity of what is considered “other,” Derrida 
complicated this position. In Aporias he argued that Heidegger’s Dasein cannot be understood totally in 
terms of its capacity for dying (Sein zum Tode), its possibility of not being there. For if this death is 
completely other to Dasein, it can never become constitutive to it. Therefore, death is never totally other 
from the living Dasein—there is always dying in living. For comparative thinking this is useful since it 
tells us that what is other is never really so radically other as to preclude the possibility of some sort of 
communication or encounter. Other and self are always mutually inserted in each other. 
What is “other,” however, is not something we can summon with our language; it has to come of its own 
accord, “yet it is necessary to prepare for it; for to allow the coming of the entirely other, passivity, a 
certain kind of resigned passivity for which everything comes down to the same, is not suitable. Letting 
the other come is not inertia opening to anything whatever.”11 This reminds one immediately of 
Heidegger’s Gelassenheit, which is also not a passive attitude; it is an active opening up of your own 
thought structures that is necessary for other ways of thinking to find an entrance. Derrida argued for a 
similar attitude, a responsible opening. Deconstructions provide this opening “by bending [the] rules with 
respect for the rules themselves in order to allow the other to come or to announce its coming in the 
opening of this dehiscence.”12 The Oxford English Dictionary defines “dehiscence” as “gaping, opening 
by divergence of parts” and states that the term is mostly used in connection with plant life.13 For Derrida 
it is the space created by opening up our thought structures, by deconstructing what is supposedly an 
identity, and this is what makes any intercultural encounter between the self and the other possible. 
                                                          
8 See, for example, J. Hillis Miller, “Derrida’s Others,” in Applying: To Derrida, ed. John Brannigan, Ruth Robbins, 
and Julian Wolfreys (London: Macmillan, 1996), 153 – 170. 
9 Kearney, Dialogues with Contemporary Continental Thinkers, 123. 
10 Jacques Derrida, Aporias, trans. Thomas Dutoit (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1993), 22. 
11 Jacques Derrida, ‘‘Psyche: Inventions of the Other,’’ trans. Catherine Porter, in Reading de Man Reading, eds. 
Lindsay Waters and Wlad Godzich (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989),55. 
12 Ibid., 59 – 60. 
13 Oxford English Dictionary online, http://oed.com. 
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The status of the other is therefore not something that can be subsumed in Hegelian fashion under the 
category of the same.14 In the closing lines of Psyche: Inventions of the Other, Derrida said that “the call 
of the other is a call to come, and that happens only in multiple voices.”15 His point here is that any 
encounter with what is other can never beforehand be appropriated; it is always an encounter with 
multiple voices and thus structurally open‐ended. Yet it is always there. Of interest for philosophy and 
education in philosophy is what Geoffrey Bennington has summed up well by saying that in Derrida’s 
work “the point… is not to reintegrate remains into philosophy, but… to introduce a radical 
nondialectisable alterity into the heart of the same.”16 
Another interesting aspect of the idea of the “other,” or alterity, in Derrida in relation to comparative 
philosophy is that he seemed to link these notions closely to those of duty and responsibility. Its 
irreducible singularity makes every “other” irreplaceable, and as such, we are responsible for it. 
Reminiscent of Emmanuel Levinas, Derrida extended the notion of responsiveness to the other toward 
that of responsibility. We have already seen that this notion of responsibility is a major feature of 
Derrida’s thinking through education. Responsibility is necessarily an experience of and journey through 
a fundamental aporia.17 Therefore taking responsibility can never be reduced to following a specific 
program or logic because then it would not be a decision. That is also why the “thinking” that Derrida 
spoke about is both inside and outside of philosophy proper: “while it may not be certain that this 
thinking is philosophical through and through, it certainly implies philosophy and philosophical 
knowledge. It perhaps is not limited to philosophical knowledge, but it is impossible without that 
knowledge” (RP II, 168). The thinking of the philosophical is no longer strictly philosophical itself. To 
fully understand this, I think comparative philosophy or thinking could be valuable. 
 
COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY’S PLACE 
Although Derrida did not often speak about “other cultures,” his work in general questions Western 
philosophy and conceptuality in the traditional form it has developed over the centuries—that is, the onto‐
theological, logocentric way of thinking. Similarly, to question the ingrained Western structures of 
conceptuality is, or should be, one of the merits and tasks of comparative philosophy. 
                                                          
14 G.W.F. Hegel was especially keen on such appropriations; the whole dialectical system revolves around 
appropriating differences into an ever larger identity. Chinese thought, to Hegel, was no exception and consequently 
seen as an early stage in the development of philosophy that, of course, ended with Hegel himself. 
15 Derrida, ‘‘Psyche,’’ 62. 
16 Geoffrey Bennington and Jacques Derrida, Jacques Derrida, trans. Geoffrey Bennington (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1993), 291. 
17 Jacques Derrida, The Other Heading: Reflections on Today’s Europe, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael B. 
Naas (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 41. 
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As has to some extent been the misfortune of comparative philosophy, Derrida’s work is often not taken 
seriously within the university system, where a defense of the status quo and thus of the original 
foundations of the university and philosophy still resist any changes. As a critic of philosophy and 
literature Derrida may enjoy a certain status in some departments,18 but outside of these the overall 
influence of his thinking, especially on the modern university structure, is marginal or negligible, and 
Derrida’s ideas of what the university as a place of research and teaching should be(‐come) are, within the 
reception of his wider work, largely overlooked. Similarly, the approach to philosophy that is expounded 
in comparative philosophy goes largely unnoticed. Comparative philosophy is usually taken as just 
another subset of philosophy. It is my intention to show that comparative thinking can alternatively be a 
criticism of the mainstream Western philosophy that still dominates philosophy education. 
Derrida’s relentless efforts point to the question of opening philosophy to the world, and not 
of imposing philosophy on the world. I think again of the usual marginalization of other than Western 
philosophy within the university system of philosophy departments. But within comparative philosophy 
as a distinct discipline there is also a tendency to accept authority of interpretation, to let one 
interpretation prevail and become more powerful than others, even when textual, philosophical, or 
historical analyses do not really support this privilege. Chad Hansen has shown that in the necessary 
exercise that is the reconstruction of much of Chinese philosophy, there has been a “reappropriation” of 
diverse ways of thinking to Confucian standards.19 Similarly, the works of Roger Ames and David Hall, 
among others, have consistently attacked what were or are considered to be the dominant theories of 
Chinese scholarship in favor of a reinterpretation of Chinese classical thought that would be more aware 
of the imported Western conceptuality and thinking, and that would seek to avoid this as far as possible.20 
So comparative philosophy should (and does) also take a critical look at itself and open itself to 
dissenting, different views of how to interpret thinking in other cultures, rather than showing the same 
stifling one‐sidedness that Western philosophy and philosophical education still exhibit. 
We can see the same problem in another important part of comparative philosophy: translation. 
Translation of works belonging to profoundly different cultural backgrounds is always a difficult task. 
However, in philosophical works (even more than in other works), regardless of cultural background, 
language is not just a tool or medium. With Derrida we have seen that language itself is constitutive of the 
                                                          
18 We must remember that much of current postmodernism and deconstruction, although usually connected to 
Derrida, are not necessarily part of his thinking. Derrida on numerous occasions argued against many of the 
interpretations his work received in academic circles, be they positive or negative. To some extent, he had to defend 
himself against both the strict philosophers and the deconstructionists who took off on his words. 
19 Chad Hansen, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1992). 
20 For example, see Roger T. Ames and David L. Hall, Daodejing: Making This Life Significant (New York: 
Ballantine Books, 2003). 
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experience of reality and thinking. Thus the problem of comparative philosophy is how to relate different 
experiences in different languages through translation. The translation problematics show a major danger, 
but also the possibility of a major contribution of comparative thinking toward a new understanding of 
philosophy. Translating can be seen as one of the vital “institutions” of comparative thinking. As such, we 
could agree with Derrida that this institution is inevitable. The real issue is not that we translate, 
but how we translate, and into what sort or kind of language. In the form of ontotheological metaphysics, 
in whatever language, philosophers have always spoken and written “in a certain manner, which is called 
philosophy, this manner of speaking and writing being of the most singular kind” (RP I, 29, emphasis in 
original). Philosophy has thus come to be identified as a discourse that is highly specialized and specific, 
and even within this philosophical language there are specializations that do not lend themselves easily to 
translation: “Within every language, European or not, what we call ‘philosophy’ must be linked regularly 
and differently, according to eras, places, schools, social and socio‐institutional circles, to distinct 
procedures among which it is often difficult to translate” (RP I, 29). So we should not be surprised to find 
that ways of thinking from profoundly different cultures are not only hard to translate into a Western 
language, but are impossible to translate into the Western way of thinking or doing philosophy. Only 
recently has comparative philosophy begun to fully understand this deeper implication of comparing and 
translating. It is not just a language that is translated; it is a philosophy and worldview in it. And what is 
most important in comparative philosophy is the philosophy behind or rather in the translation. Since no 
translation is innocent, every translation means an interpretation. This interpretation, however, “does 
not begin… with what is commonly called translation. It begins as soon as a certain type of reading of the 
‘original’ text is instituted ” (RP II, 19, emphasis added). For example, we can see that earlier, but also 
recent, translations of the Daodejing have more often than not used language that is tied to, and implicitly 
confirms in its superiority, a philosophy that is foreign to the way of thinking of the culture from which 
the work is translated.21 We thus come to another double bind, where we acknowledge the necessity of 
translating, while remaining aware of its dangers and reserved as to its possibilities. In the face of this 
(im‐)possibility and undecidability, we must take responsibility for guarding vigilantly against what 
Derrida would call a “reappropriation” of non‐Western thinking by metaphysical forces of which one, and 
certainly not the least, is precisely the language we use (RP II, 150–151, also 153). 
The similarity between Derrida’s concerns and comparative philosophy thus only holds if comparative 
thinking guards itself against reappropriation of non‐Western ways of thinking to onto‐theological or 
logocentric standards, against accommodation into the identifying structures of mainstream philosophy, 
which would amount to reducing or denying the differences between cultures and ways of thinking. Yet 
comparative thinking must at the same time guard itself against an overly radical relativism, whereby 
                                                          
21 For a criticism of this practice, see, for example, Ames and Hall, Daodejing, Making This Life Significant, 11–54. 
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different cultures are beyond criticism or understanding: “Beware of the abysses and the gorges, but also 
of the bridges and the barriers. Beware of what opens the university to the outside and the bottomless, but 
also of what, closing it in on itself, would create only an illusion of closure” (RP II, 153). The double bind 
announces itself again: as we have seen, Derrida not only argued for opening up philosophy, but 
simultaneously warned against anything that would denounce the integrity and unity of the philosophical, 
or we should rather speak here now of “thinking.” Any sort of relativism that would challenge the rigor of 
“thinking” is thus resisted. Not “anything goes,” but at least more should go. While he argued for opening 
up philosophy, Derrida made definite demands of what is to be called philosophy. His expectations entail 
a necessary critical competence that he wanted to expand into a new or renewed enlightenment. Not just 
any worldview will automatically qualify as philosophy, or better yet, as thinking. A couple of passages 
could shed some light on this problematic double task. First of all, as Derrida said, 
not every community will be called philosophical from the moment it practices skepsis, epoche, 
doubt, contestation (pacifist or violent, armed with discourse or other powers), irony, questioning, 
and so forth, regarding its constitutive bond, and thus the properness of what is proper to it. But 
no community will be called philosophical if it is not capable of re‐examining, in every possible 
fashion, its fundamental bond…. (RP I, 17, emphasis in original) 
So having a culture in the sense of a worldview pure and simple does not yet count as having a 
philosophy. We need something more. This “thinking” entails a certain sense of responsibility and 
responsiveness, and Derrida tried to give us an idea of what these amount to. First, he recognized that this 
“new” responsibility is a decision, and as such, again, it lies outside the domain of calculation and 
rationality. The university, as we saw earlier, is founded on a contract itself not reducible to reason. 
Similarly, the decision not to close itself off, to take responsibility in fields larger than its traditional 
domains, is to be taken by the university, and amounts to a responsiveness to alterity, or the other—that 
is, to the “invasive margin[s],” or the so‐called outside, which threaten the traditional understanding of 
philosophy and under which we can of course count comparative philosophy (RP II, 95). 
Second, this responsiveness means that we acknowledge coming from a certain place, and acknowledge 
other places. That is, we do not come into the dialogue without any position. Philosophy is first of all, 
then, “a very rich tradition, texts, a wealth of discourse, of argumentation, of… questions, metaphysics, 
regional ontologies, epistemology in the broadest sense, politics, and so forth” (RP II, 161). I would 
suggest that this concept of philosophy as a critical competence is one that we are all familiar with. It is 
close to a worldview or a culture, but Derrida said, rightly I think, that “without opposing them, 
philosophy is different from science, technology, culture” (RP II, 162). Philosophy is the discipline that 
questions these concepts by means of self‐reflection. But then, Derrida also said that philosophy is that 
thinking which is no longer purely philosophical, or it is rather differently philosophical, in that it 
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questions the traditionally philosophical from various standpoints not necessarily philosophical in the 
earlier sense. Deconstruction is one name of this thinking, which “is perhaps no longer scientific or 
philosophical, in the sense in which these words can be determined today. It is in fact this indetermination 
and this very opening that we designate… by the word ‘thinking’” (RP II, 202–203). 
I would suggest that one of the functions of comparative philosophy is a similar thinking, in that in and 
through its comparisons it questions the standard conceptions, interpretations, and explanations that 
traditional philosophy offers from a differently philosophical or thoughtful standpoint, meaning from a 
culturally different paradigm of thinking. Derrida said that systems of thought that are different from 
those in the West are first of all “not necessarily limited” to the philosophical form of the West; neither 
are they “reducible to what, from a philosophical standpoint, we name with categories like ‘culture’, 
‘worldview’” (RP II, 242–243). 
Based on this we could formulate a double bind for ourselves here. While there is definitely room for the 
differently philosophical of other cultures, not just anything in this area will count as philosophical or 
thoughtful. The question, which I am not going to answer here, is what will and what will not? Here we 
could also criticize Derrida. His demands were essentially still connected to some traditional Western 
values, but at the same time they were instilled with both a new vigor and a lot of reserve. He argued for 
ideas such as human rights and democracy while acknowledging the difficulty in doing so from a pluralist 
standpoint. Derrida did not just want us to respect and acknowledge “differences, idioms, minorities, 
singularities, but also the universality of formal law, the desire for translation, agreement and univocity, 
the law of the majority, opposition to racism, nationalism, and xenophobia.”22 I think he rightly 
acknowledged the double bind or injunction and therefore could not and did not offer a formula or 
program to lead us out of the difficulties, but remained with the indeterminacy and openness. 
Coming back to education, comparative philosophy shows different ways of thinking and aims to put 
them forward within a renewed university system or within a renewed teaching of philosophy. As an 
example, from certain parts of Eastern philosophy we could learn that thinking, or knowledge, necessarily 
entails forms of practice and is often aimed at a certain competence or, shall we say, wisdom. This could 
(quite literally speaking) be incorporated in the university structure. Teaching should be seen as doing: 
philosophy is action, and teaching as a practice is most definitely inter‐action with an “other.” This 
communication involved in the learning process is much more than or different from the passing of 
information, as we can see, for example, in the teaching methods of Zen Buddhism. 
                                                          
22 Derrida, The Other Heading, 78. 
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Comparative philosophy can be related to another important feature of Derrida’s thinking. He argued that 
it is no longer possible to distinguish between purely constative and purely performative speech acts, 
especially in his polemic with John Searle.23 But in Eyes of the University: Right to Philosophy II, Derrida 
made this awareness central to the teaching of philosophy, connected it to the university structure, and 
used it as one of his arguments for showing how basic and end‐oriented research can no longer be sharply 
distinguished. Since language is inherently performative, so is research and teaching. This is not only true 
for empirical disciplines, but also and more importantly for philosophy. The university is not just a place 
of theory and theoretical knowledge; it can no longer pretend to deal just with disinterested, disconnected, 
objective work: 
every philosophical or, more generally, theoretical language implements, under its apparently 
“constative” or descriptive appearance and norms, “performative” forces that have in general 
been ignored, or rather denied, in any case, deprived of all legitimacy in the institutions of 
“knowledge”. (RP II, 208) 
The awareness of this denial or ignoring should lead to a “reconsideration of all the hierarchical theorems 
and principles upon which the systems of research and teaching are constructed” (RP II, 209). In my 
opinion this means that Derrida discredited the usual hierarchies that function to keep comparative 
philosophy or thinking from other cultural backgrounds at bay under the argument that they would not be 
theoretical or philosophical enough. Derrida’s argument says that the university and philosophy should let 
this “ivory tower” attitude go since it is no longer, and probably never was, tenable. 
Again we can draw comparisons with some parts of Eastern thinking on two levels: First, as noted before, 
traditionally, Eastern educational institutions were places where the performative was acknowledged and 
given due importance. They were not just places of gathering theoretical knowledge. Learning as well as 
teaching were seen as processes that transformed not just cognitive skills, but the whole person or persons 
involved. Second, in Confucianism, Daoism, and Zen Buddhism, we do not readily find the idea that 
language is a pure transparent medium. Language is guiding discourse, it does things—it is not just 
descriptive, but presents a world. This aspect of language has only recently gained attention in Western 
philosophy, but it was an integral part of much classical Asian thinking. Ames and Hall, for example, say 
that 
Daoist naming… is presentational rather than just representational, normative rather than just 
descriptive, perlocutionary rather than just locutionary, a doing and a knowing rather that just a 
saying.… Such knowing is dependent upon an awareness of the indeterminate aspects of things. 
The ongoing shaping of experience requires a degree of imagination and creative projection that 
                                                          
23 Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc. (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1988). 
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does not reference the world as it is, but anticipates what it might become.… And having access 
to the “name” of something is not only a claim to knowing it in a cognitive sense, but more 
importantly, to knowing how to deal with it.… Hence such knowing is a feeling and a doing: it is 
value‐added. It is naming without the kind of fixed reference that allows one to “master” 
something, a naming that does not arrest or control.24 
Apart from the fact that the wording is remarkably close to Derrida’s, I see a striking similarity with 
Derrida’s way of thinking that is concerned with questioning Western ideas of fixed reference, arguing for 
provisionality, and arguing for an anticipation of, and thus responsibility for, the future, what is to‐
come (l’a‐venir), from an indeterminacy. In the Zhuangzi it is said that “words are not just wind. Words 
have something to say. But if what they have to say is not fixed, then do they really say something? Or do 
they say nothing?”25 And further on: 
We have already become one, so how can I say anything? But I have just said that we are one, so how can 
I not be saying something? The one and what I said about it make two, and two and the original make 
three.… The Way has never known boundaries; speech has no constancy. But because of [the recognition 
of a] “this,” there came to be boundaries.26 
We can see here that both Daoism and Derrida share the idea that while language is without fixed 
reference, we must nevertheless make use of it, and we must do so while aware of its provisionality and 
of its performativity—the fact that it does present a certain world. The Laozi similarly speaks of the 
mistrust and provisionality of language in many places. One example is chapter 32, where it is said that 
“When we start to regulate the world we introduce names.” It is acknowledged that this is an inevitability; 
however, “once names have been assigned, [w]e must also know when to stop. Knowing when to stop is 
how to avoid danger.”27 Using language is inevitable, and it is inevitably arresting the flow and 
introducing hierarchies. Being aware of this has to do with knowing when to stop relying on this 
performative fixation; to remain open we must use language carefully and under erasure to stop it from 
becoming dogmatic. 
Derrida (and Heidegger) similarly suggested a very careful use of language that is aware of this 
performativity and provisionality in its operations. For example, both argued against the way language is 
used by the metaphysical tradition. The return to philosophy that Derrida pleaded for should thus 
definitely not be understood as a return to the strictly metaphysical, but as a return to the more than 
                                                          
24 Ames and Hall, Daodejing, 45 – 46. 
25 Burton Watson, trans., Zhuangzi: Basic Writings (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 34. 
26 Ibid., 38 – 39 (emphasis in original). 
27 Ames and Hall, Daodejing,127. Other discussions of language are found on pages 1, 2, 23, 25, 43, 56,76, 78, and 
81. 
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philosophical, which should entail a new university enlightenment, a return to basic and fundamental 
research, and a broadening of scope with regard to responsibility and awareness of its consequence—or, 
to use a problematic notion, a return to the true spirit of philosophy, which is of course not something that 
was lost in the past somewhere, but that always remains as a task ahead. 
I am not suggesting that comparative philosophy is the answer to this perceived crisis (in the teaching) of 
philosophy, but it is one of the possible forms this new thinking and responsibility can take and one of the 
possible alternative positions from which to question philosophy. But in order to be able and allowed to 
do so, it must be institutionalized and given space, as well as remain vigilant against its own 
presuppositions. In the proposals that Derrida wrote for the formation of such a new institution of 
thinking, the College International de Philosophie, we read that one of the major focuses of this new kind 
of thinking should be comparative: 
Most of all, this international openness must allow, in a more traditionally philosophical field, for 
the multiplication of original initiatives whose historical necessity is more obvious than ever 
today. We know that the “philosophical world,” assuming it still has a unity, is not only divided 
into “schools” and “doctrines” but also, beyond and independently of philosophical contents and 
positions, divided according to linguistico‐national borders that are more difficult to cross than 
political borders. These traditional differences in “style,” “rhetoric,” “method,” and so on are 
sometimes more serious than differences in doctrine. Although they cannot be reduced to national 
languages and traditions, they nonetheless remain part of these. These philosophical areas 
between which passages are rare, whether in the form of critique or polemics, are a historical—
and philosophical—challenge to philosophy. (RP II, 215, emphasis added) 
This suggests that Derrida was aware of the need to give comparative thinking a recognized space. 
Precisely because of the “incursions,” “invasions,” “disruptions,” translation problems, and the like from 
outside of philosophy into its field, there is an urgent necessity to acknowledge and come to terms with 
this already mentioned “alterity of the other.”28 Similarly, Daoism is to a large extent based on notions of 
nonconventionality, be it in conduct or language, as a necessary prerequisite for creativity and a full 
development of the self. Nonconventional ways of thinking and acting should be cherished for the sake of 
diversity as against one‐sidedness, because they better reflect the ongoing process of the world to which 
man belongs. 
Derrida focused his entire career on this necessity to question the logic of self‐sameness, of self‐identity, 
and of the dualistic way of thinking in Western metaphysics. The logic of subject/object and other 
                                                          
28 This coming to terms with cannot be understood as a Hegelian dialectical movement, of course, but should entail 
an acknowledgement of differences. 
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characteristics or distinctions of Western metaphysics have been imposed upon Chinese philosophy and 
other cultures for a long time, while in Derrida’s view it was crucial to question these distinctions and to 
look for other ways of thinking. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Education in philosophy must incorporate comparative philosophy as a major part of the curriculum. Only 
when offered with and exposed to multiple ways of thinking will someone see the relative value of each 
different philosophy. Without this education in diversity, it is all to easy to become entrenched in a certain 
way of thinking, and for most professional philosophers today that still means following the onto‐
theological ways of Western metaphysics. The university and philosophy must guard against this one‐
sidedness, and they must remain or become again, to a certain extent, “without condition.”29 
In a way Derrida’s work on education is very appropriate to our times, since it is indeed becoming 
increasingly difficult to keep outside influences out of or away from our own preferred systems. Derrida 
pointed to the fact that this form of exclusion is one‐sided, untenable, and quite frankly a distortion of that 
all‐important philosophical notion, truth (which is also kept “under erasure”). But as we have seen, within 
comparative philosophy the same dangers lurk and, following Derrida, we can call for vigilance against 
one‐sidedness here too. 
Unless we open philosophy to the world of thinking and start doing so in our educational systems, 
philosophy will remain an island—and the university will over time become an island—that is out of 
touch with reality and merely representative of a particular form of rationality, increasingly under 
pressure. 
 
                                                          
29 Jacques Derrida, “The Future of the Profession, or, the University Without Condition (Thanks to the 
‘Humanities,’ What Could Take Place Tomorrow),” in Jacques Derrida and the Humanities: A Critical Reader, ed. 
Tom Cohen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 24. 
